Casualty control communications is extremely important to the operation and organization of the ship. Without adequate and proper means of communication between the different units, the whole organization of casualty control will fail in its primary objective.

To ensure that sufficient means of com-munications are available, several different systems are installed aboard ship. The normal means of communications are the battle telephone circuits (sound powered), interstation 2-way systems (intercoms), ship service telephones, ships loud speaker (1-MC), and voice tubes. Messengers are also used in some situations when other methods of communications are not available or when written reports are required.

The transmission of correct information re-garding a casualty and the speed with which the report is made are essential to be of value in any method of communication.

It is also essential that control of all com-munication circuits be established by the con-trolling station. The circuits must never be allowed to get out of control, because of cross-talk caused by more than one station operating at the same time and each assuming that it has the prior-ity message. Casualty control communication must be incorporated into casualty control train-ing, since prompt action to notify the control sta-tion or engineering control of a casualty must be taken to prevent the development of other casualties which could be more serious than the original casualty.

INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE

Inspection and maintenance are vital to suc-cessful casualty control, since they minimize the occurrence of casualties due to material failures. Continuous and detailed inspections are necessary not only to discover partly damaged parts which may fail at a critical time, but also to eliminate any underlying conditions which may lead to early failure (maladjustment, improper lubrication, cor-rosion, erosion, and other causes of machinery damage). Particular and continuous attention must be paid to symptoms of malfunctioning, such as unusual noises, vibrations, abnormal temperatures, abnormal pressures, and abnormal operating speeds.

Operating personnel should thoroughly familiarize themselves with the specific temperatures, pressures, and operating speeds required for the normal operation of equipment, in order to detect all departures from normal operation.

When a gage, or other instrument recording the operating conditions of machinery, gives an abnormal reading, the cause must be fully in-vestigated. A spare instrument, or a calibration test, will quickly indicate whether or not the ab-normal reading is due to instrument error. Any other cause must be traced to its source. Because of the safety factor commonly incor-porated in pumps and similar equipment, con-siderable loss of capacity can occur before any external evidence is readily apparent. Changes in the operating speeds (from those normal for the existing load) of pressure-governor-controlled equipment should be viewed with suspicion. Variations from normal pressures, lubricating oil temperatures, and system pressures indicate either inefficient operation or poor condition of machinery.

When a material failure occurs in any unit, a prompt inspection should be made of all similar units to determine if there is danger that other similar failures might occur. Prompt inspection will prevent a series of repeated casualties. Strict attention must be paid to the proper lubrication of all equipment. Frequent inspections and samplings must be made to ensure that the correct quantity of the proper lubricant is in the unit. Lube oil samples must be taken daily on all operating auxiliaries. Lube oil samples should be allowed to stand long enough for any water to settle. Where auxiliaries have been idle for several hours, particularly overnight, a sufficient sample should be drained from the lowest part of the oil sump to remove all settled water. Replenishment with fresh oil to the normal level should be in-cluded in this routine.

The presence of saltwater in the oil can be detected by running a standard chloride test. A sample of sufficient size for test purposes can be obtained by adding distilled water to the oil sam-ple, shaking vigorously, and then allowing the water to settle before draining off the test sam-ple. Because of its corrosive effects, saltwater in the lubricating oil is far more dangerous to a unit than an equal quantity of freshwater. Saltwater in units containing oil-lubricated ball bearings is particularly harmful.

TRAINING

Casualty control training must be a continuous step-by-step procedure and should provide for refresher drills. Any realistic simulation of casualties must be preceded by adequate prepara-tion. You and your work center personnel must learn to understand fully the consequences of any error which may be made in handling real or simulated casualties.

The majority of all engineering plant casualties can be attributed to a lack of knowledge of the correct procedures on the part of the watch sta-tion personnel. Often a relatively simple problem, if allowed to compound itself, could lead, ultimately, to the disabling of the ship. The causes of ineffective casualty control and their preven-tion are listed as follows:

1. Lack of positive control. The Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW) must maintain positive control of every situation that arises and must possess thorough knowledge of the correct procedures and systems operation.

2. Lack of effective communications. Com-munications throughout the engineering plant must be maintained at all times. The repeat back technique for watchstanders is the only means of ensuring that communications are received and understood.

3. Lack of systems knowledge. Watch person-nel are frequently shallow in their depth of systems knowledge and approach to casualty control. Watch sections must be familiar with the opera-tion and theory of all vital engineering systems.

4. Lack of casualty control assistance. Off-watch personnel are not called to assist in casualty control follow-up actions with the result that watchstanders are unable to satisfactorily deal with recovering from a casualty. Off-watch personnel must be called to provide requisite ex-pertise and augment assigned watchstanders per-forming restoration actions.

In the past, the primary emphasis in casualty control training has been placed on speed. However, with the development and implemen-tation of the Engineering Operational Casualty Control (EOCC) portion of the Engineering Operational Sequence System (EOSS), a more methodical and organized approach to casualty control has resulted in increased control, less disabling of a plant, and an increase in the overall safety to the plant and personnel.

To ensure maximum engineering department operational readiness, a ship must be self suffi-cient in the conduct of propulsion plant casualty control drills. The management required for such drills involves the establishment of the Engineer-ing Casualty Control Evaluation Team (ECCET) and the preliminary administrative support for the training program.