IDS EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTION

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Explain exterior and interior sensors. Describe the following subsystems: data transmission and annunciator, control, and display. Explain the operating power requirements for IDSs.

Each intrusion detection system is comprised of various types of equipment that operate in unison to complete the overall detection function. In addition to sensing devices installed at protected locations, data generated by the sensors should be transmitted by electrical impulse to control annunciator display equipment in a central alarm annunciating station. Electrical power should be supplied to all items including backup power. Each equipment category comprises a subsystem and is described in the following paragraphs.

SENSOR SUBSYSTEM

The sensor subsystem is divided into two areas, depending upon environmental use and application: exterior and interior.

Exterior Sensors

Exterior intrusion detection devices (sensors) should be selected for the best performance under prevailing local environmental conditions such as soil, topography, weather, and other factors that could adversely affect performance or increase false alarm (an alarm without a known cause) rates. Exterior IDSs should bean approved DOD standardized system, such as the Base Installation Security System (BISS), or commercial equipment approved by CNO (N09N)/CMC (POS-40), as appropriate, as an element of the DOD standardized system. Presently installed IDSs not meeting the standards of this instruction may continue to be used until replacement is necessary. Waivers or exceptions to use presently installed IDSs are not required.

Interior Sensors

Interior IDSs should be an approved DOD standardized system such as the Joint-Service Interior Intrusion Detection System (J-SIIDS), the AN/GSS-20, or commercial equipment approved by CNO (N09N)/CMC (POS-40), as appropriate, as an element of the DOD standardized system. Presently installed IDSs not meeting the standards of this instruction may continue to be used until replacement is necessary. Waivers or exceptions to use presently installed IDSs are not required

DATA TRANSMISSION SUBSYSTEM

The data transmission subsystem links sensors with control and monitoring consoles. The transmission medium is used to send control signals and data to and from all sensors, control points and annunciator panels. It may be hardwired land lines, radio frequency links, fiber optic cables, or a combination. This vital subsystem is the weakest and most vulnerable of the IDSs and requires protection.

ANNUNCIATOR, CONTROL, AND DISPLAY SUBSYSTEM

The annunciator, control, and display subsystem provides equipment for central operational control and monitoring of the IDSs. Through this equipment, security force personnel are instantly alerted to the status of any protected area. This subsystem should be located in a restricted area and closed off from public view. Alarmed spaces should be designated by zones.

OPERATING POWER REQUIREMENTS

The power to operate an IDS is usually 115-volt ac electrical power, available in each protected area and the security force headquarters except where safety requirements prohibit its use (hazardous storage areas, and so on).

The importance of ensuring that the IDSs will operate continuously cannot be overstated. Each IDS should have an emergency power source to ensure the system's continuous operation. Emergency backup power sources usually consist of rechargeable batteries, or an emergency generator, or both. Paragraph 0809i in OPNAVINST 5530.14 contains a detailed discussion on emergency power sources.

IDS POLICY

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Explain IDS equipment procurement policy. Describe military construction (MILCON) and OPNAV/CMC designated sites. Explain the policy regarding emergency power, contractor qualifications, installation, and maintenance.

Only IDS standard equipment with formally evaluated capabilities should be used. No IDS should be procured that cannot be supported for the life-span of the equipment, usually 10 years. System design should consider the delay time of associated barriers, location of reaction forces, and the threat to the protected asset. Now let's consider MILCON IDSs AND IDSs for OPNAV/CMC sites.

MILCON IDSs

Facility IDSs that are installed under the MILCON program should be acquired by competitive procurement. Design guidance should be according to NAVFAC DM 13-02 for background and review and NAVFAC NFGS 16727 to match the requirements of the asset to be protected.

IDS FOR OPNAV/CMC-DESIGNATED SITES

Due to the size and complexity of an IDS, certain sites have been designated as OPNAV/CMC. These sites commonly involve both interior and exterior sensors subsystems, electro-46 optical alarm assessment subsystems for perimeter sensors, extensive data transmission networks, and central computers for security monitoring and control. Examples of these types of sites are those storing nuclear weapons, sensitive conventional ordnance, and critical readiness assets. Within the Marine Corps, IDS is centrally managed by CMC (POS-43).

Technical support for system integration, design, procurement, and installation is provided for both services by the Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center (NAVELEXCEN), Charleston, South Carolina. Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Activity, St. Inigoes, Maryland, provides technical support for closed circuit television subsystems, thermal imagers, and other assessment devices.

Proprietary Type of IDS

All systems within the Navy and Marine Corps should be of the Proprietary type except when used in civilian communities or Reserve Centers. In these circumstances where there is no government force available, the system may be the Police Connection type or Central Station type. Telephone answering services should not be used. If the police connection type is used, formal arrangement should be made with the local police to ensure they monitor and respond to the system.

Emergency Power

An emergency backup (secondary) power source should be provided for operation of the IDSs. This secondary power source should be provided by an uninterrupted emergency generator, if available, or by batteries. Batteries should have adequate capacity to maintain proper operation of the system under normal operating conditions for a minimum of 4 consecutive hours in the event of ac power failure. To calculate the size of batteries, 105 percent of the capacity necessary should be provided and it should be assumed that during the period of operation on backup power, 5 percent of the detection circuits will be in the alarm mode. If a computerized IDS is used, the computer must be provided with a continuous-type uninterruptible power supply (UPS).

Contractor Qualifications

The contractor used to install, service, and/or maintain intrusion detection equipment and/or security alarm systems should be listed by Underwriters Laboratories (UL) in a commercial burglar alarm category for the appropriate level of protection required by the facility and should be staffed and equipped to provide maintenance on the system on a 24-hour-per-day, 7-day-per-week basis with a response time of not more than 4 hours.

The UL requirement for contractors is listed in NAVFAC NFGS-16727. Verification of UL listings can be made by calling the Group Leader of the Burglary Protection and Signaling Department Certification Service. Phone numbers can be obtained from LEPS Teams located in Norfolk, Virginia, or San Diego, California.

INSTALLATION

The following installation procedures should be adhered to:

1. The preferred installation method for all UL-listed IDSs is through qualified personnel from the base public works office or a designated Navy field activity, such as NAVELEXCEN Charleston.

2. Knowledge of the details of a specific IDS may afford an individual the means to effectively bypass the installation. Usually the original installation of an IDS is accomplished under a construction contract, and various elements are involved-the contract document, specifications, detailed drawings, and the actual

physical labor necessary to install the device. Sensitive documents, such as the as-built drawings that show both specific design details and locations of components, should be considered for a security classification assigned by the command. Since most IDSs in current use are available on the open market, classification of the systems themselves is not appropriate. The general location of the system is not classified, although its ^presence should not be publicized. The contract _document itself may reveal only sensor locations and administrative specifications involved in the contract. However, to make sure an IDS is used to protect classified material, contractors should be chosen from those with a facility clearance and only cleared personnel used to install, inspect and maintain IDSs where access to classified interests is involved.

All as-built drawings and a sufficient quantity of maintenance, operator instructions, and engineering and schematic drawings should be provided to the security officer before installation, testing/acceptance.

MAINTENANCE

Proper maintenance of an IDS is imperative. Systems not properly maintained may fail to detect intrusion or yield a high number of false/nuisance alarms, thereby losing credibility and demoralizing the security force to the point where alarm activations may be often ignored. As a result, the level of security may be less than that obtained without an IDS. The more complex an IDS, the more highly skilled and trained the maintenance technicians must be. The number of technicians required to maintain an IDS depends upon the system's complexity and reliability. Vacations, sick leave, coverage of more than one malfunction at a time, and similar factors must also be considered. Maintenance can be provided by trained government personnel (military or civilian) or by contract. The contracting activity should develop procedures to ensure only cleared personnel inspect and maintain an IDS, when considered appropriate by the user activity.

IDS Testing Frequency

All IDSs will be tested at least monthly to make sure the systems are functional. In the conduct of these tests, all individual sensors should be tested to determine the continued adequacy of their intended application. All transmission devices should be validated to ensure proper operations. Testing should be conducted in concert with the security officer. Tests should include the temporary interruption of ac power to make sure ac/dc transfer can be made and batteries or other alternate power sources are functional. Test result records should be retained for 3 years or until the next Inspector General command inspection cycle, whichever is greater.

For perimeter (exterior) IDSs, randomly selected sections (zones) should be tested daily by causing an actual alarm. Depending on the type of sensor, such alarm activations could include touching the fence, walking/running over "protected" ground, or passing through a sensor beam. The sections to be tested should be selected in such a manner that the entire perimeter IDS is tested at least monthly.

Scheduled preventive maintenance should be performed quarterly or more frequently if or when recommended by the equipment manufacturer.

Training

Maintenance training on Navy IDSs installed under OPNAV (N09N) programs is available at Service Schools Command, Great Lakes, Illinois.

Maintenance problems that result in an ineffective IDS are frequently caused by one or more of the following:

l Maintenance personnel not adequately trained or equipped (test equipment, tools, publications)

l System maintenance not assigned a sufficiently high priority

l Insufficient number of maintenance technicians

l Failure to perform routine preventive maintenance

l Lack of proper instructions and/or written procedures for security personnel responsible for operating and monitoring the system

l Failure to maintain a record on system tests, maintenance, false alarms, and similar elements for review of performance trends and potential problems

Supply Support

The availability of replacement parts will also directly affect the maintenance of IDSs. Navy IDSs (in contrast to commercial IDSs) will have supply support in place, commonly at the Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC), Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. Specific details on Navy IDS items and their support activity are contained in the Operational Logistic Support Summary (OLSS) given to each completed site.

Detailed information on commercial IDSs component selection and application; sensor/equipment descriptions and layouts; systems design; and installation, maintenance, and testing is contained in NAVFAC DM-13.02. General physical security equipment information is also described in the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory (L56), Port Hueneme, California publication titled Physical Security

Equipment Manual. Information on the Navy IDS program and equipment can be obtained from NAVELEXCEN, Charleston, South Carolina. Information on the Marine Corps IDS program can be obtained from CMC (POS-40).

SUMMARY

In this chapter, we defined several physical security terms and outlined the composition of a security department. Security committees and command key control procedures were also covered. Next, we looked at security inspections and perimeter and area protection and control. We also examined restricted and nonrestricted areas and the minimum security measures required for each area. Limited waterway areas were considered next, and we then looked at signs and posting of boundaries. Protective lighting was also covered, followed by physical security surveys and control of personnel and vehicles. Finally, we examined the types and characteristics of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs).