PHYSICAL SECURITY REVIEW BOARD

The physical security review board (PSRB) is very similar in composition and mission to that of the PSRC. It is, however, designed to address security-related matters on a base or installation-wide perspective. The PSRB is chaired by the host command/activity, and its membership is comprised of representatives of all tenant command/activities. The primary goal of the PSRB is the coordination of mutually supportive physical security and loss prevention practices. Minutes from PSRB meetings should be made a matter of record and retained by the host command in the same manner prescribed for PSRC minutes.

COMMAND KEY CONTROL

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Describe the criteria for selection and the duties of the key control officer, key custodian, and key subcustodian. Explain the purpose of the key control room and the importance of a well-organized key center. Explain the use of lock control seals and the procedure for lockouts.

Command key control is a vital part of a command's physical security program. In this section, we discuss the responsibilities of key control personnel and key control procedures.

KEY CONTROL OFFICER

A command key control officer should be designated in writing by the commanding officer. Personnel selected should have a Secret security clearance, or more ideally, a security clearance equal to the highest level of classified material held at the command. Selecting personnel with a proven ability to organize is also helpful. Smaller commands may find it best to select the security officer/manager as the key control officer because of the close ties to the facility's emergency services and control. The person selected should have a good working relationstip with the security department.

KEY CUSTODIAN

A key custodian should be designated in writing by the key control officer. The person selected should hold a security clearance at least equal to the assets controlled by the key and lock program. Personnel from within the security department are excellent choices because of the focus on working relationships with the security department. In smaller commands, the key custodian and key control officer may be the same person.

KEY SUBCUSTODIANS

Key subcustodians should be designated by their respective department heads or tenant commands and approved in writing by the key control officer. These personnel may be given control of one or more sub master keys, depending upon the need and mission. For example, the fire department may be designated as a key subcustodian and may have access to all facility keys. Departments may be subcustodians, but the mission of one may require a different key application than that of another. Reliability and integrity play very important roles in the selection of a key subcustodian. The security clearance of subcustodians should be equal to the highest classified level of material secured.

CENTRAL KEY ROOM

Duplicate keys, key blanks, padlocks, and key-making equipment should be secured in a central key room according to OPNAVINST 5530.14. Access should be limited to the commanding officer, key control officer, key custodian, and locksmith. This room should have restricted access and be secured when not in use. Key blanks and duplicate keys should be given the same classification protection as the original keys. At commands too small to warrant or require a central key room, a GSA-approved security container with a three-position combination lock may be used to protect duplicate keys, blanks, and associated equipment as described in OPNAVINST 5530.14. Key codes should also be kept in the central key room. These codes should be kept in an authorized security container as previously discussed.

KEY CENTERS

The importance of an effective index-coordinated key center cannot be overstated. These centers should be co-located with 24-hour staffed sites, such as emergency services dispatch centers. Adequate personnel should also be considered when evaluating a key issue point so that any diversions to the issuer's attention will not compromise the program's integrity. Ingress and egress to and from the key issue point should not compromise the dispatcher or operator in any way. Smaller commands located independently from a major facility may not have a 24-hour emergency support center. The key control should be handled by the key control officer or custodian as required by the commanding officer and according to with Navy policy.

LOCK CONTROL SEALS

Inactive or infrequently used gates must be locked and have seals affixed. The approved seal is a car ball end seal, Military Specification MIL-S-23769C. Security personnel should be instructed that lack of free play (approximately one-eighth inch) indicates the possibility of tampering and a follow-up examination of the seal should be conducted. All seals should be serialized and stored in the same manner as keys. All unused seals should be inventoried annually. The security officer should control placement of entrance seals and account for seals on hand, issued, and used.

LOCKOUTS

Lockouts occur when a lock becomes inoperable for some reason; all lockouts involving restricted areas or buildings should be investigated by security personnel. The investigation should determine if the failure occurred because of lock malfunction or as a result of attempted or actual unlawful entry.

SECURITY INSPECTIONS

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Explain the importance of security inspections and the reporting requirements for security inspections. Describe quarterdeck inspections, administrative inspection of vehicles, and the exemption for NCIS personnel.

Each naval activity must establish a system for the daily after hours checking of restricted areas, facilities, containers, and barrier or building ingress and egress points to detect any deficiencies or violations of security standards. Security deficiencies or violations found during after hour checks should be reported to the activity security officer, the department involved and the commanding officer. These incidents should also be reported to activity departments or other local elements having security responsibilities within specific security programs affected by the incident. Each deficiency or violation should be followed up by the activity security officer, and a record kept of all actions taken (structural, security, disciplinary, administrative, and so on) by the responsible department or other organizational elements involved to resolve the present deficiency or violation and to prevent recurrence. All security deficiencies, violations, breaches of security rules and regulations, and criminal incidents discovered and handled by the security force will be recorded on OPNAV Form 5527/1.

QUARTERDECK INSPECTIONS

Quarterdeck inspections should be conducted according to OPNAVINST 3120.32. No person should refuse to present for inspection by the OOD/authorized personnel or Master-at-Arms any item of baggage or article in his or her possession or on his or her person or knowingly conceal in any container or on his or her person any article with intent to deceive or evade the lawful inspection of such articles.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTION OF VEHICLES

All vehicles on naval installations are subject to administrative inspection according to procedures authorized by the commanding officer. As ordered and directed by the commanding officer, authorized security personnel will, while in the performance of assigned duties, administratively inspect vehicles entering or leaving the installation. Such inspections are deemed reasonably necessary to protect the premises, material, and utilities from loss, damage, or destruction.

Because important constitutional questions are involved, no person or group maybe exempted from, or singled out for, such inspections. And the instruction by commanding officers regarding such inspections should be coordinated in advance of implementation with the local JAG or Naval Legal Service Office officials to ensure strict adherence to a structured random inspection pattern.

At the minimum, guards should be instructed that incoming persons and automobiles may not be inspected over the objection of the individual. However, those who refuse to permit inspection should not be allowed to enter. Persons who enter should be advised in advance (a properly worded sign to this effect prominently displayed in front of the access point will suffice) that they and their vehicles are subject to inspection while on board the installation and upon departure. Persons who refuse to submit their vehicle to an authorized inspection while on board or upon departure may be detained long enough to obtain a warrant for search of the vehicle, issuance of a letter barring future entrance to the installation, or such other action as may be appropriate.

EXEMPTION FOR NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

NCIS personnel and their vehicles, used in the course of official business, are exempt from administrative inspection of vehicles upon presentation of a badge and/or credentials when entering or leaving Navy installations.

PERIMETER AND AREA PROTECTION AND CONTROL

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Explain the reason for conducting a risk and threat analysis. Explain the concept of enclaving. Describe the two types of area designations.

Before a decision to use security measures is made, a thorough risk and threat analysis should be performed to determine the degree of physical security required. As reflected in paragraph 0203 of OPNAVINST 5530.14: "In certain cases, extensive and costly security measures may be necessary to protect certain items of security interest. However, in each case the commanding officer of an activity is responsible for complying with established security requirements while at the same time working to achieve economy. To achieve this objective, higher echelon security requirements must be clearly understood. Additionally, the relative criticality and vulnerability of the security interest must be evaluated in relation to a ranking of potential threats, and a specific level of security must be calculated to ensure the best possible protection for that threat level in a cost-effective manner." Only after these preliminary factors are addressed can proper controls be instituted.

Installation or perimeter and area protective controls are the first steps in providing actual protection against certain security hazards. These controls are obtained through the use of protective barriers and other security measures. They are intended to define the installation/activity/area boundaries and are used to channel personnel and vehicular access. Security barriers may be natural or structural and are addressed in chapter 6 of OPNAVINST 5530.14.